 |
| Teddy Lishan Desta, PhD |
Teddy is an Associate Editor for the Journal of the International Relations and Affairs Group (JIRAG). He has lectured at colleges and universities on International Affairs. He holds a PhD in International Relations from The University of Texas at Dallas, a Master of Science in Economics degree from Baylor University. He specializes in International Relations Theory, International Trade, Economics and the International Political Economy.
On one side, there is the
opposition made of civilians and army deserters, and these are drawn mostly
from the Sunni community who make up the majority of the population of Syria.
And there is the regime, on the other side, battling the opposition using the
Syrian army and the so-called militias (known as the Shabbia). As the elite army forces and the Shabbia are drawn from the ruling Alawite sect and the opposition
is mainly driven by Sunnis, this gives a sectarian aspect to the ongoing armed
conflict in Syria. Basically, the majority Sunnis are rising against the
minority Alawite ruling class.
Since the start of the street
protests back in March 2011, there has been no let down on the opposition side
to give up on its demands for regime change and little sign of relenting on the
government part in its heavy-handed crackdowns. The month of July has witnessed
the escalation of the conflict taking the battle right to the capital city,
Damascus, and right to the very power corridors of the Assad government. As the
result, there have been reports of running battles in some quarters of Damascus
between the armed and well-organized opposition on one hand and the Syrian army
on the other. On July 18, the opposition succeeded in infiltrating
even the inner most circle of the regime, inflicting one of its most deadly attacks
against it. On that day, using an apparent suicide attack, the opposition
succeeded in killing a few of the most senior government officials tied to
national security, including the defense minister.
Now almost everyone believes
that Syria is in a virtual civil war. But the question is given the grim
developments in Syria is whether all these were predictable from March 2011
when the uprising started. Did anyone foresee the country dragging itself into
a long-drawn apparent civil war? Here is one example of an exercise in
predictive politics done in the early months of the Syrian uprising. The pieces
were written mostly between June and November, 2011.
The predictive-cum-scenario
analysis exercise starts by commenting (c. June 2011) on the question of how
much loyalty the Syrian army will owe to regime. The analysis began by asking
if the Syrian top brass would act like the Tunisian and Egyptian generals where
in those countries the army removed its loyalty to the state leader and sided
with populace crying out for political change. Hence the question on Syria was the following:
Will the regime crack? Will the army begin to split in its
loyalty to Assad? Will there be a sustained uprising by the Sunnis, turning
their localities into ungovernable areas?
However, foreseeing a prolonged period of conflict unless
the regime deeply compromised with the opposition, the following idea was proposed.
The proposal was made in the hope that the Syrian leaders would learn some
lessons from the Tunisian and Egyptian experiences. Would the Syrian leaders be
forced to recognize that they would no longer be able to suppress the growing
protest movement even if they tried hard?
I believe in a phased and negotiated transition. It is less
disruptive and if managed correctly leads to a stable future. The Syrian
opposition should negotiate with the old guard so that the present leaders
relinquish power peacefully. I hope the old guard understands that its days are
numbered or that it can no longer govern in the same manner any longer. They
may be looking for a fair chance to bow out of power in grace. A negotiated
transition will give them the rare chance to retire in peace. That is what made
Latin America's and SSA's transition to democracy less disruptive.
I think convening a constituent assembly and writing a
constitution while still the old guard is around will make for a
"peaceful" transition in Syria. But trying to sweep away the old
regime all together is messy and a long-term threat to stability of Syria and
the whole region.
Subsequently, I wrote,
If they [i.e., Syrian leaders] cannot see the writing on the
wall, bad for them. By now they should have learned the Biblical lesson that
"a crown will not last forever." I hope they heard or read somewhere
that "those who refuse to learn from history, will be condemned to repeat
its mistakes." And in history there have been plenty of fallen regimes to
learn a lesson or two.”
Let us hope and pray that they will compromise in the true
sense of the word, avoiding dragging their nation towards a long-drawn unrest.
Actually in the early months of
the protest, there were a few positive signs where the Syrian president was prepared
to make some concessions to the opposition promising to carry out some
mollifying reforms. Had he persisted in making genuine reforms, I argued here,
that he would have easily opened the flood gates and Syria would have easily embarked
on the way to political reforms as demanded by the opposition. However, the
government was violently suppressing peaceful street protests while it appeared
to make some compromises. Therefore, I began to reason:
i).The Syrian regime is bringing out its worst form for all
to see. Despite the suppression, the opposition has not given up hammering with
determination. Yes, the regime is developing fissures. If the people keep the
pressure, the regime wall will give in at its weakest points.
ii). The signs of the developing crack are visible now.
These are mainly in the forms of concessions Assad has been offering to the
opposition. It is probable that once the regime starts to make these types of
concessions, it can enter a slippery slope situation. The regime may think it
is in full control of everything, but it is an illusion of control. They cannot
stop the' momentum of change that is born of decades of suppression. Whenever
the people are dealing with a fascist regime, they may need to push the harder.
iii). Who said only the Ba’athists are nationalists? The
opposition too are true Syrians. The accusation that the opposition is fighting
to dismember Syria and sell its pieces on e-bay is dubious. The regime can
accuse the opposition as thugs, saboteurs, and agents of foreign agents. But
should we suspect them of base motives?”
I believed that Syria’s leaders will open up the political
space quickly seeing the consequences of the democratic upheaval in the region.
I desired to see a phased and well-managed transition in Syria, as has been the
case with Tunisia and Egypt where old regime institutions (like the army and
the court systems) played a critical part to ensure a less disruptive
transition to a democratic rule. The signal from the opposition that it was
ready to enter into negotiation on the primary condition that the Syrian leader
steps down in favor of one his vice presidents give me some hope for a relative
peaceful transition in Syria. Because according
to news reports,
"The organizers of local and nationwide demonstrations
say they won't participate in any national dialogue that would not have Bashar
Al-Assad stepping down in favor of one of his vice-presidents, presumably the
long-standing foreign affairs specialist Farouk Al-Sharaa..."
I tried my case for a phased transition, noting:
i). Rather than calling for the complete sweep away of the
Ba'ath regime (which outcome has its own grave dangers), this phased-out
approach to the Syrian crisis promises an orderly transition to the new era.
When many are waiting in the wings to fish in troubled Syrian waters, at this
stage, Syrians should be smart enough to avoid a regime collapse that could be
followed by a civil war...
I hope the Syrian opposition residing in Turkey will tone
down its rhetoric and adopt this approach.
ii). Once the above demand is granted, the demonstrators
should go home to give the politicians some time to map out the transition
period. A strong and stable government is needed in this transition period lest
politics and economy further slide into the abyss. The people should let the
politicians do their job.
There should be an element of continuity in any political
change of this magnitude. Otherwise, we will be begging for a societal
meltdown.
We cannot make the Alawites feel as if they are being swept
out of power altogether. We cannot put other minorities on edge, making them
fear of a coming tyranny of the majority. To fail to do that is to beg for
endless crisis and even for a civil/ ethnic war.
In the cases of Egypt and Tunisia - it is the military
generals (for the sake of state and national stability) who intervened and are currently
mid-wife-ing the new political order of their countries. I call these generals
(and top civil servants) elements of continuity because they belong to the
outgoing regimes.
In the case of Syria, because there is a strong ethnic
quality to the army top brass, perhaps the ruling party will find a way to
negotiate the necessary change with opposition and civil society groups. The Ba'ath
Party should quickly find a novel arrangement/ approach to ensure that element
of continuity in the midst of great changes. An element of continuity - a
phased transition - is necessary to help Syrians to avoid total regime collapse
and an Alawite rout which both outcomes have immense economic, political and
social consequences. I bet on Ba'ath party level-headed elements to recognize
this need and steer Syria in the right direction.
Dissecting
the Syrian Regime
I also did some
regime analysis, trying to foresee how the Syrian regime might fall.
At that point in time, I still expected the Syrian regime to
have learned a few lessons from the Tunisian, Libyan and Egyptian leaders’
experiences making small reforms that could snowball eventually. [1]
Then I got pre-occupied studying regime collapse, wondering what takes a
“security regime” like that of the Ba’ath regime in Syria to fall.
What is the lesson from history; what makes for the demise
of fascist/ totalitarian regimes?
(i). When they get crushed by a foreign military power.
Cases: Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, Saddam's Iraq, etc.
(ii). When their army is overwhelmed by internal armed
rebellion. Case: Mengistu's regime.
(iii). When a new leader starts to reform the system and
that snowballs and leads to the end of the regime. Case: Gorbachev's USSR.
(iv). When the global (or regional) power structure changes,
and no longer a Great Power supports the local autocratic regime. Case: Latin
American dictatorships; East European communist regimes.
If Assad's Baath regime ever falls, by which of these ways
will its fall come?
Given the internal line up of forces and the regional and
global power support it garners now, the only and most likely way the regime
can meet its demise is through a snowballing reform effort.
So the opposition through a combination intense pressure and
negotiation can force the regime to move slowly to a point of cascading
reforms. The tipping point comes the day a constituent assembly convenes and a
new constitutions starts being written.
Then took a broader look at regime types to defend my
position why the Syrian regime is autocratic and what that implies for its
future.
How does the state manifest itself in a polity? Let us
identify here at least three major types of state - society power
relationships.
i). The leader is
supreme: The political leader is supreme over all, over the state and over
the nation. Everything revolves around him and almost everything emanates from
him. As the famous declaration of Louis XIV put it, "l'Etat c'est moi."
It is very hard to distinguish between
the will and actions of the supreme leader and that of the state. Historical
cases give indications that the people and the state exist for/ because of the
leader. But we hasten to note that "l'Etat c'est moi" could be of two
kinds; the supreme leader can be outright dictatorial, or paternalistic.
ii). The people are
supreme: This is the case of democratic or pluralistic societies. Here The
government (rulers) and the state exist and function because the people willed
them into existence and operation through popular consent. The people have the
power to change any aspect of the nature and structure of the government or the
state through rules prescribed by the constitution. Policies designed and
implement by the state generally reflect the will of the people.
iii). The state is
supreme: Here the party rules making obedience to the state as the supreme
ideal of the polity. An ideology of statism, as for example espoused by Italian
fascism, holds that: Sovereignty is vested not in the people but in the
national state, and that all individuals and associations exist only to enhance
the power, the prestige, and the well-being of the state. The concept of
statism, which is seen as synonymous with the concept of nation, and
corporatism repudiates individualism and exalts the nation as an organic body
headed by the Supreme Leader and nurtured by unity, force, and discipline of
the political party. [2]It
is to this category that Ba'ath party states like that of Syria historically
belong.
Under statism people's "consent" (acquiesce) to
the state comes from either out of fear, or from the economic or security
(stability) benefit the people think the State ensures them. But differences
and tensions between the State and the people arise whenever the people demand
for individual liberties, or for share in the running of the government through
their directly elected representatives, or for regional autonomy (or group
rights). Statist leaders (as fascist/ Ba'athist leaders are) believe only in
the utter submission of the people to the will of the State, and they go over
time to suppress the peoples' demands. Bloody crackdowns will become the order
of the day as the fascist state tries to inculcate the fear element on the
people.
This is Syria's current experience - a popular uprising
trying to move the polity to a pluralistic society and a fascist state which
tries its best to keep the status quo.
Two things are quite noticeable in the Syrian crisis. The
people have broken the fear factor through which fascist leaders keep the
existing order. The next step will be for the people to form parallel (shadow)
state/ government institutions. These institutions will gradually undermine the
monopoly of state power and functions held by the fascist state. As the Syrian
people withdraw their "consent" from the Ba'ath fascist state, they
will effectively leave the political leaders few subjects to control/ govern.
As the result the Ba'ath state will gradually wither away. It will enter
obsolescence because now the people are building their own state institutions
which are based on popular consent. The more the Ba'ath state becomes
irrelevant and redundant, the more the people will get closer to achieving
their freedom. The international community should understand this dynamic to
encourage and support the effort of the Syrian people in this direction.
Civil
War is Coming!
By summer, it became clear to me that Syria was headed into
a civil war and that there was a degree of inevitability to it. I worried army
desertions would grow to give the opposition a more experienced fighting force.
Unlike most interstate wars, civil wars do not begin with a
"declaration of war." A country simply slides into civil war
imperceptibility, with a clash here and a clash there, and with a now-on and a
then-off style of armed confrontations. Given the way the Syrian regime uses
its army today - in brutally suppressing the popular uprising - the regime is
unwittingly creating the conditions for desertions within the army. It will not
be lost for long on the minds of the young soldiers that who is being cut down
by the Syrian army machine guns and tanks are not foreign soldiers, but Syrians
- their own family and kin. If this keeps going on, then the cracks will widen
in the Syrian army, resulting in an irreparable breach in its ranks. That the
Sunnis make up the majority in the rebellion camp as well as in the army that
composition makes that danger of army desertions a high possibility. It is this
danger that the regime should fear most now.
And added these in subsequent posts.
Defection from the Syrian army is growing and the deserters
are organizing and fighting back pro-regime forces. The trickle yet will become
a flood taking Syria down the road of a bloody civil war.
The country could slide into a civil war. At some point the
people could rise up in arms and resist the regime forces (soldiers and
militias), saying "enough is enough; we are not going take this anymore
lying down." The Syrian government is forcing the people in that sad
direction. It appears to be just a matter of time before we see these peaceful
demonstrations turning into insurgencies. First it will be here and there as
isolated incidents; but later these fires will join to become a major
conflagration of armed conflict of national span.
Let us not forget the foot soldiers are predominantly Sunni,
so are the protesters too. As the regime persists with its brutal suppression
of the uprising, eventually, the Alawi commanders could be left with their few
special forces or even a phantom army to lead.
The trickle of defection could gather speed. The soldiers
may no longer tolerate to see the carnage of their own kin or remain deaf to
any call by their people to come and stand by them. The voice of a mother or a
father could be more compelling than that of the commanding officer.
So as a the Syrian social fabric gets torn and as the
communal fissures widen and economic class interests polarize, then the various
sectarian and economic interests will align according to their status quo/
outcome preferences. Then the battle lines will become more clear, but nastier.
Soon I began to wonder about likely outcomes in the Syrian
crisis. I tried to predict the likely directions events could lead the country.
I played with a few probable scenarios, but my bet was on an incipient civil
war engulfing the country. This was
written in summer 2011.
What are the possible scenarios for the Syrian crisis
unfolding in the near future? Here are a few possibilities.
i). Scenario A: The Syrian leadership will heed the advice
of the UN, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and all these emissaries. It will stop its
bloody crackdown and it will begin to make concessions to the opposition camp.
The regime will likely enter the negotiation with the opposition camp from a
"position of strength". The government will make and follow through
with meaningful reforms based on a realistic timetable. As the result, slowly
Syria will return to normalcy.
What is the chance that al-Assad will listen to the advice
of outsiders and enact meaningful reforms? I give it a chance of only one out
of ten.
ii). Scenario B: The Syrian leaders will persist in their
violent crackdown in the belief that they can permanently quash the uprising.
On the other hand, the people will refuse to be silenced rather choosing to
stand up and challenge the regime for many days to come.
As the more this continues - the killings and demonstrations
- Syria will slide more into economic and social chaos. And slowly the country
will start to fragment and pockets of armed resistance groups will pop up
throughout the country. These groups will draw followers along sectarian lines.
And as a virtual civil war emerges, the Syrian army cracks and fragments along
confessional lines, and its ranks thin out due to desertions.
This scenario precludes foreign powers intervening directly
supporting one side.
The chance of this scenario transpiring is quite high. I can
give it a chance of four out of ten.
iii). Scenario C: The more the Syrian leadership persist in
its killings, the more it will earn the opprobrium of the rest of the world,
where concerned countries and international bodies will keep on delivering
advice, rebuke and sanction to the Syrian leadership. To prevent a worse
massacre from taking place, or to prevent the collapse of the whole country, or
to deliver their co-coreligionists from the harsh measures of a minority
sectarian government, particularly regional countries may feel the need for
"military" intervention.
The military intervention will not be of the Libyan or Bosnian
kind, but of a limited and of a different kind. Regional countries like Turkey
(and remotely Saudi Arabia) may be likely candidates for such a "limited"
military intervention. For example, Turkey has already suggested it may enter
Syrian territory to set up a buffer zone. Turkey's excuse is to provide Syrian
refugees a safe shelter in case the Syrian government attacks a major city like
Hama with disproportional force. And more recently, Turkey has indicated that
it will begin to regard the Syrian crisis as its own internal crisis, because
the two countries share 800-miles long border!
Here, there is precedence to drawn upon. In the 1980s, in
the height of Lebanon's civil war, Syrian forces entered that country to keep
peace in Lebanon. The Syrians entered Lebanon with the tacit approval of the
Saudis, the US, and even Israel. The Syrians stayed in Lebanon for many years.
But today, the Syrians themselves may be on the receiving end. Turkey may
likely enter Syrian territory with the approval of other major countries.
Turkish forces showing up at their common border, may force the Syrian
government to consider its bare-knuckle behavior towards its civilian
population. Such intervention by outsiders may weaken the Syrian leadership
prowess and make it to negotiate with the opposition in earnest.
What is the chance that outside forces like Turkey's will
show up on Syrian territory to make the Syrian army behave humanly? I give that
a chance of two out of ten.
At some point, I added,
Last time I commented on the Syrian scenario, I gave the
prospect of armed civil conflict odds of 4 to 10. Now I will like to raise it
to 6 to 10. Why? (i) the chances of a negotiated settlement grows dimmer by the
day as both sides seem to dig in their respective positions, (ii) the
likelihood of Assad's rule being replaced by a more accommodating regime as by
coup d'etat looks unlikely, (iii) the opposition is quite determined to keep
protesting despite the mounting cost they are paying at the hands of the
pro-regime forces, (iv) the level of political violence on both sides is
rising, involving high profile killings, (v) the Syrian regime support from other
countries is dwindling, giving heart to the oppositions forces to stand firm
their ground, etc.
If his interview with British journal, the Daily Telegraph,[i] says anything, President al-Assad is quite determined to 'wage war" against his opponents. However, they too are determined to resists his efforts and fight on - the very recipe for a protracted armed civil conflict in Syria.
If his interview with British journal, the Daily Telegraph,[i] says anything, President al-Assad is quite determined to 'wage war" against his opponents. However, they too are determined to resists his efforts and fight on - the very recipe for a protracted armed civil conflict in Syria.
At the same time, I was mapping out what would and should
happen on the opposition side. The opposition was relentless in its defiance
against a regime which was showing little qualms in using strong tactics to
suppress the uprising:
What does the future entail for Syria? Neither the Syrian
government nor the people seem to back-down from their convictions that have
set them on a collision course from the outset. The discipline and the
determination the masses have shown and the sacrifices they have made so far
gives all the indications that the people are in it until the bitter end.
However, for the opposition to achieve their objective of replacing a Ba'ath
party with pluralistic democracy there should be some re-thinking to be done in
terms of tactics.*
It is one thing to stand up bravely and be gunned down for
one's belief; but it is another thing to do the fighting in a smart way to
quicken the demise of one's opponent.
These are just three suggestions made by way of hastening
the victory of the people.
i) Organization: At the top, opposition parties should get
themselves an umbrella type organization to coordinate the revolution. The opposition speaking and acting as one
body, will seriously threaten the regime. And at the grassroots level, there
should appear, throughout the country, secretive cells or revolutionary
councils that should coordinate the uprising and pressure the regime. These
secretive councils would also function as parallel (shadow) local
"governments", where they will gradually undermine and curtail the
administrative reaches of the government. They will serve as vehicles by which
eventually transfer of allegiance and authority to new sets of institutions
will take place. These types of local councils will make Syria ungovernable,
literally making the country out of the reaches of the regime.
ii). Propaganda: There is a need to create alternative media
sources, which will effectively counter the regime's mass media - national tv,
radio and print media. There should be an information war to be waged as much
as street-level uprising and international sanctions.
Alternate media sources will have multiple objectives. They
will further galvanize the people, provide the uprising with critical
information for the day-to-day struggle, spur the yet-not-mobilized sections of
the population to join the revolution, and effectively and permanently
de-legitimize the regime in the eyes of the masses, and introduce the masses to
new political ideals and their possible future leaders. The international
community can help the opposition to set up tv and radio stations in nearby
places like Turkey, or do it through satellite streaming. On the other hand,
setting up underground newspapers within Syria can be a relatively easier task
given the level of popular resistance to the current regime.
iii). Infiltrating the ranks of the security forces should
be another area of focus for the opposition. Making contacts with sympathetic
elements within the security forces (army, police and secrete service, etc)
could serve a double purposes: (a) vital source of information related to
regime's plans and operations, and (b) planting the idea of change within the
ranks of the security establishment. These institutions thus can be undermined
from within, making them to crumble eventually.
The international community need give the nudge and support
to the opposition in these additional and very critical forms of struggle.
In due course the prognosis got grim, as I to give up all
hope in the Syrian government to show reasonable attitude to compromise.
What will be the outcome of this unrest in Syria? The Syrian
state will decay; its feared army will dissolve and disintegrate. Syria will
empty out, as the educated and business elite leave the country for the safety
of other nations. Why, because the regime is committing suicide by falling on
its own sword. Its appearance to fight on will only prolong Syria's unhinging.
Foreign
Interference
I also entertained ideas wondering which regional powers could
be involved in the Syrian crisis and why.
At this point it may be safe to assume that the power
struggle in Syria involves only two clear-cut major groupings - the dictatorial
Ba’athist regime and its allies on one side, and the opposition, which has an
aspiration for a pluralistic society, on the other side. By assuming this
likely power alignment to persist in the future, we can begin to investigate
the likely role of outside powers in trying to influence the outcome of the
Syrian power struggle. Among all regional and world powers, I predict, the
major tussle to influence Syrian affairs will be between Turkey and Iran.
(i). Turkey will side with the opposition and will plan for
a post-Assad Syria. Turkey may see the current Syrian unrest as an opportunity
to get greater leverage in Syria at the expense of Iran and Russia. Turkey as a
secular (or moderate islamist) democracy may hold great attraction to Syrian
opposition figures. For Turkey to win Syria will be a sign of its growing clout
in the region.
(ii). Iran will try its best to keep intact its influence
with the Assad regime as long as it can. Therefore, Iran may collaborate with
the Syrian regime to crash the rebellion against Assad. Iran may not even
hesitate to use Lebanon's Hezbollah as its proxy to assist in order to preserve
Iranian influence in Syria. And if push comes to shove, Iran may even unleash
Hezbollah into Syria's domestic turmoil. Simply put, Iran cannot afford to lose
Syria - Iran's closest ally in the region and its gateway to Lebanon - to
Turkey or to anyone else.
(iii). Another regional power which like to be involved in
Syrian affairs might be the other regional power, Saudi Arabia. The problem
with Saudi Arabia is that it does not have a horse to back in Syria yet.
Because Saudi Arabia is a monarchy, it is not a popular figure with the Syrian
opposition. And Assad's Ba’athist regime is no friend of Arab monarchies,
either. Moreover, Assad may not want to damage its useful relationship with
Iran by siding with the Saudis now. So for the moment the Saudis (despite their
wealth which they can throw around to buy friends) are sitting idly by on the
sidelines.
(iv). Other regional powers, namely Israel and Egypt are out
of the Syrian question for the moment. For obvious reasons, it is very hard to
imagine Israel being involved in shaping Syria's politics; and Egypt is too
busy running its own revolution. [Next I will try to examine what role the
Great Powers may play in Syria's turmoil to determine its future.] “
And I also wrote:
But Damascus by taking steps which makes it look like that
it is not listening, what is it thinking?
A). The uprising is controllable; it is just a matter of
time before the regime can bring everything under control. Al-Assad thinks time
is on its side as the "majority" of Syrians, particularly the middle
class the security branches of the state. For many , stability under al-Assad trumps
democracy and the likely chaos attendant transition.
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/MH13Ak01.html
But the idea that the uprising will die down could back fire.
The whole country will be up in revolt gradually. This could lead to:
i). regime fractures, leading to the rise of a new
leadership
ii). a civil war
B). The whole thing will remain a Syrian internal affair; no
one will dare to interfere. But the idea that no one will dare to interfere
from outside could also backfire:
a). The UN could bless the effort to de-legitimize the
Syrian regime.
b). Turkey may send her troops to the Syrian border to put
pressure on Damascus.
c). Foreign powers could engineer a coup d'etat, if
possible.
It was the last point of a possible coup which I again took
up in July 2012.
There
is some interesting aspect to the Syrian political crisis, the lessons it
teaches us about the right or wrongness of foreign intervention in the midst of
a popular uprising and a repressive regime. What the unfolding Syrian civil war
is showing is what Libya would have become if the Western nations had not
intervened directly to support the Libyan opposition. The barely armed Libyan
opposition fighters were no matches to the heavily armed Gaddafi’s regime. But it does not mean that
Gaddafi would have easily wiped out the uprising, which had every sign of
continuing at least in the eastern provinces which had always felt neglected
and left out.
The
Syrian story equally would have been the story line of Iraq if Saddam Hussein
had been left in power, which he could easily have done so given his security
Ba’ath state. However, his fate would have been determined by the Arab Spring,
a popular uprising for democratic rights staged across the region which he
could not have easily thwarted. Iraq’s fate would have resembled Syria’s for
the major reason that Iraq’s power distribution parallels that of Syria in many
ways. In both countries a very repressive Ba’ath regime has been in power, with
a very personal as well as ethnic element in the power structure. Compared to
Syria, in Iraq the ethnic balance of power has reversed. Unlike in Syria, the
Sunnis in Iraq are a minority population making only about 20% of the
population. However, Saddam’s co-ethnics, the Sunnis though a minority group
had dominated Iraqi politics for long years. On the other hand Iraq’s majority
population the Shiite, which made up to 60% of the population, chafed under
Sunni dominated Ba’ath misrule. Equally, the Kurds, a sizable Iraqi minority
group, also had suffered immensely under the hands of Saddam. Therefore, the
arrival of the Arab Spring at the doorsteps of Iraq under Saddam would easily
have given us the civil war scenario unfolding before our own very eyes in
Syria today.
Russia
and Iran to the Rescue?
At last, sometime in mid 2012, Russia started to show some
signs of cooperating with the West to ease al-Assad out of power and create in
anew transitional government. In July
2012, I wrote,
Russia
is finally recognizing that supporting the Baath regime is no longer
sustainable. Russia is finally seeing that its obduracy to frustrate any effort
at "regime change" in Syria is a losing game than a winning one.
Therefore, Russia is finally acting in her best geo-strategic interest in Syria. What Russia is trying to do now can be described as a push for a "soft coup" in Syria. This can likely save Russia some foothold in the new Syria to be born.
On the other hand, the Iranians all along were wiser than the Russians when it
comes to the Syrian crisis. From the outset they were advising Bashir al-Assad
to listen to the people. Of course, the Iranians will also play a strong
"behind the scene" role to press the Syrian regime to make realistic
concessions to the opposition. So through whatever left of the old regime, Iran
too will be able to keep some of her influence in the new Syria. Hence, the
"soft coup" will be in the interest of Iran as much as that of
Russia. Therefore, Russia is finally acting in her best geo-strategic interest in Syria. What Russia is trying to do now can be described as a push for a "soft coup" in Syria. This can likely save Russia some foothold in the new Syria to be born.
This was besides my expectations;
from the earliest day, that at least Turkey will set up a safe haven inside
Syria to protect civilians from Syrian government slaughters. I relied on new
reports much on this possibility. [3]
Conclusion
As things stand in the last
week of July, the much emboldened armed opposition is taking the Syrian army
face to face in battles in cities and in rural areas. Some parts of the
outlying regions and border areas, like the Kurdish region and the Syrian –
Iraqi border area are virtually out of the hands of government forces. In short,
Syria is engulfed in civil war, and as some say it is a matter of time before
the regime falls and Syria enters a very uncertain political future. In the
midst of the bitter struggle for power in Syria, some worrying questions are:
-
Will the civil war prolong as
the regime and the Alawi choose to fight to the bitter end, or will the
opposition succeed to score a quicker victory in easing out president al-Assad
from power and succeed in forming a national unity government that will save
Syria from further bloodshed?
-
Will Syria fragment into
fiefdoms, where the country virtually breaks up into Sunni, Alawi and Kurdish
areas with attendant ethnic cleansing?
-
Will Syria become a theater
of regional and global rivalry? Will Russia, Iran and Hezbollah stand by the
Syrian government side and Western nations and Middle-East Sunni stalwarts like
Saudi Arabia and Qatar side with the opposition, making the Syrian crisis more
than a civil war but a proxy war?
Sources
My discussion of the Syrian crisis can be found in the
following LinkedIn posts.
[1] Note: I called the Syrian Ba’athist
regime statist, something bordering on a fascist state, for want of a better
term then.
[2]
See - en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Statism.
