Friday, November 25, 2011

Roles and Responsibilities of the Former Position of DCI (prior to post 9/11 changes) and the Current Position of the DNI




Daniel J. Evans is the Executive Director and Editor in Chief of the International Relations and Affairs Group.  He has experience analyzing how crises unfold and evaluating contingencies for dealing with complications as they arise. His specialties are foreign affairs research, International Relations Theory, Systems Theory, Globalization, Geopolitics, Intelligence Analysis and Homeland Security. His training deals with assessing transorganizational structures for the management of Homeland Security and developing plans for coordinating networked Homeland Security organizations.


The roles and responsibilities of the former position of DCI (prior to post 9/11 changes) and the current position of the DNI: tasking, funding, and DCI/DNI relationships with other members of the IC, the Administration and Congress

There were three functions of the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI): head of the CIA, chief intelligence advisor for the president, and director of the IC. The DCI reported directly to the president and through the national security advisor. The DCI gave the president the annual IC budget called the National Foreign Intelligence Program. As head of the IC the DCI had the responsibility to direct and coordinate national foreign intelligence activities, but was only directly in charge of the CIA, and its staff organizations (Best, Cumming & Masse, 2005). The DCI had two advisory boards, the National Foreign Intelligence Board and the Intelligence Community Executive Committee. The IC/EXCOM advised the DCI on national intelligence policy and resources, stuff related to the IC budget, establishment of needs and priorities, evaluation of intelligence activities, and formulation and implementation of intelligence policy (FAS, 1996).

The Director of National Intelligence (DNI) is a national security expert; is appointed by and reports to the president, but is not located in the White House and is not in charge of the CIA or member agencies. The two main responsibilities of the DNI are (1) “overseeing national intelligence centers” and (2) “managing the National Intelligence Program” (Richelson, 2008 p 454). Other duties are serving as head of the IC, and advising the White House on intelligence matters. The DNI took over the DCI’s community role, with additional authority (CIA, 2007). A separate official is the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and reports to the DNI. The head of CIA now only has provision of the overall direction and coordination of national intelligence abroad by human sources, and under the DNI’s direction, coordination of the relationships between US intelligence agencies and the intelligence or security services of foreign governments or international organizations (CIA, 2007).  

Budgetary authority of the DNI is stronger than the DCI. The DNI develops and determines the NIP and guarantees successful execution of the community budget. Community member organizations give the DNI information necessary to create a consolidated NIP; the DNI manages NIP appropriations, directs allotment and allocation via department heads. With the structuring of the NIP, the DNI gets the guidance of the Joint Intelligence Community Council and reports to the President and Congress the inability of departmental comptrollers that fail to follow their instructions in the implementation of all components of the NIP (Best, Cumming & Masse, 2005).

The DNI’s works with the secretary of defense to direct and watch over funds, and recommendations, in agreement, or the consultation of the appointment of some agency heads. The DNI also has the ability to approve budgetary reprogramming and transfers that are within certain restrictions. Additional tasks concerning establishing direction, determining requirements and priorities, are comparable that of the DCI. The office of the DNI contains a principal deputy, the NIC, a general counsel, a director of science and technology, the national counterintelligence executive, about 500 new positions and about 100 rotational posts giving the DNI staff more manpower than the DCI (FAS, 1996).

Does the DNI has enough authority to fix the problems that were the catalyst for the formation of that position?

The DNI has changed many of the aspects of the former DCI. While the DNI seems to have more authority and additional duties, there is now the problem that the DNI may have too many jobs and responsibilities. The DNI may have recreated many of the same dilemmas the 9/11 commission pointed out, such as giving too many jobs to the DNI. Certain things will probably be the same as they were with the DCI, such as the relationship with the secretary of defense. There is the possibility of improving the coordination of foreign and domestic intelligence, considering it has been suggested as one of the most difficult tasks of the DNI (Best, Cumming & Masse, 2005).  

There are still many uncertainties with the DNI. The disconnection of the DNI from significant agency capabilities will possibly make it appear to control the IC; however, it will essentially be disengaged with modest contribution (CIA, 2007). There is also the possibility that it gave the same, if not worse disparity of power and accountability former DCIs had in the past. Another problem is that the public may assume that the DNI will totally fix the problems in the intelligence community. However, it is too early to tell if the president will support the DNI when tough choices are made or imposed.  Congress may now have a larger role in intelligence affairs, bringing in the interference of politics into national security matters that the executive branch should be taking care of (CIA, 2007).

However, it looks as if the main positive that will come from the DNI is that it might bridge the foreign and domestic separation and give more leadership with planning and a better incorporation of intelligence efforts. While the DNI has greater budgetary authority and a larger staff this could take away from its function of supervising the NIP and the supervision of intelligence centers and turn it into a similar bureaucracy that is seen in other organizations (Best, Cumming & Masse, 2005).

The DNI now has the authority over budget, reprogramming, personnel transfer, appointments, acquisitions, tasking, and authority over the National Counterterrorism Center (Best, Cumming & Masse, 2005). This gives DNI more authority to fix problems, but it seems like too many jobs, which was one of the problems there was supposed to be remedied. Authority is good but the more the DNI has the more problems that could also me created because of it.

References
Best, R. Cumming A. & Masse T. (2005). Director of National Intelligence: Statutory Authorities. CRS Report for Congress. Retrieved February 20, 2010 from: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/RS22112.pdf
FAS (1996). An Overview of the Intelligence Community. Retrieved February 20, 2010 from http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/int023.html