Daniel J. Evans is the Executive Director and Editor in Chief of the International Relations and Affairs Group. He has experience analyzing how crises unfold and evaluating contingencies for dealing with complications as they arise. His specialties are foreign affairs research, International Relations Theory, Systems Theory, Globalization, Geopolitics, Intelligence Analysis and Homeland Security. His training deals with assessing transorganizational structures for the management of Homeland Security and developing plans for coordinating networked Homeland Security organizations.
In Building Sustainable Peace, Mahmood Mamdani was quoted as observing that "...there are three types of explanation of the [Rwandan] genocide - political, economic, and cultural." Does the same categorization apply to the conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone or Nagorno-Karabakh? Does this question allow you to explore a theoretical construct and apply it to other case studies?
The violence is continued by what is referred to as “blood diamonds”; these diamonds are used to finance the rebel group’s militant activities. The Revolutionary United Front or RUF leads the violence within Sierra Leone (De Koning, 2008). The RUF was backed by the Liberian government of Charles Taylor, who had the plan that he would force the Sierra Leone government with the RUF to forfeit from ECOMOG or the Economic Community of West African States Military Observer Group. Taylor used ethnic agitation as a method for the division of people in Sierra Leone (TED, 2000). The RUF caused millions of internally displaced people, committed acts of genocide and tortured victims by cutting off their hands and other body parts and took over the capital of Sierra Leone, Freetown. Originally the RUF was able to fight ECOMOG but eventually they were able to drive the RUF out of Freetown and regaining control. Though this would not be the last of the RUF with their "Operation No Living Thing" even though they were not the force they once were the instability of it was able to inflict much damage on ECOMOG and any civilians they encountered.
In 1999 the UN Mission in Sierra Leone or UNAMSIL replaced ECOMOG and worked to enforce the Lome Accord, a peace agreement signed on July 7th by the RUF and government of Sierra Leone. However, the peace was short lived and the RUF was able to use this as a way to gain for weapons (Adebajo, 2002). The United Kingdom came in to assist and the RUF was again slightly taken out of commission but they regrouped and gained many of the mining areas where they are able to maintain some power because of the exploitation of the “blood diamonds.” While there are several other variables that go into the escalation of violence in Sierra Leone and the perpetuation of the RUF, much of this is because of exploitations of natural resources. The small country of Sierra Leone has many great natural resources but not a lot of infrastructure that is capable of containing much of the turmoil along with the lack of development of other aspects in the economy aid in the recruitment of youth into the RUF and other similar rebel groups (TED, 2000).
Daniel J. Evans is the Executive Director and Editor in Chief of the International Relations and Affairs Group. He has experience analyzing how crises unfold and evaluating contingencies for dealing with complications as they arise. His specialties are foreign affairs research, International Relations Theory, Systems Theory, Globalization, Geopolitics, Intelligence Analysis and Homeland Security. His training deals with assessing transorganizational structures for the management of Homeland Security and developing plans for coordinating networked Homeland Security organizations.
In Building Sustainable Peace, Mahmood Mamdani was quoted as observing that "...there are three types of explanation of the [Rwandan] genocide - political, economic, and cultural." Does the same categorization apply to the conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone or Nagorno-Karabakh? Does this question allow you to explore a theoretical construct and apply it to other case studies?
The quote by Mahmood Mamdani "...there are three types of explanation of the [Rwandan] genocide - political, economic, and cultural" is a good generalization for explaining the violence that happened in Rwanda. The Rwandan Genocide resulted in over a million deaths and much of this conflict was around 1959-1994. It was not an ethnic conflict, though it was perceived as such by many observers. The violence was between the Hutu and the Tutsi; both groups practiced the same religion, language and participated in government; the difference in the two was a caste system instead of an ethnic difference as most ethnographers pointed out. The caste system considered farmers Hutu and herdsman Tutsi. Some views were that the Hutu were descendants of “a primitive race” while Tutsi were from “the best blood of Abyssinia”. In 1959 the Rwandan king died under “mysterious circumstances” and many Tutsi feared it was a plot by the Hutu to gain power. The beginnings of the genocide killed up to 200,000 people prior to 1994 the escalation in 1994 resulted in the deaths of almost 800,000 people (Fornace, 2009). Several “political and ethnic killings” such as UNAMIR peacekeepers, the Prime Minister, and several cabinet members happened during the conflict in Rwanda. The Tutsi and “moderate Hutus” were the main targets and their killings were, for the most part, conducted by the military, the youth militia, and presidential guard. All in all, it is believed that around 800,000 people were killed (UNAMIR, 2001)
The factors the Mamdani suggested explained the conflict in Rwanda, political, economic and cultural are able to form a basic construct for much of the violence in Rwanda. However, the violence in Liberia and Sierra Leone includes the economic aspect and some of the political aspect; the cultural aspect is not as applicable. While there have been cultural aspects such as ethnic conflict, a majority of the conflicts have been regarding economic and political gains from diamond mining. Sierra Leone is thought to have a number of causes for the conflict, but much of it has to do with greed. Other factors thought to be contributory to the violence are negligence with financial decisions, corruption, lack of development and opportunities. Economic gains from diamond mining account for much of the corruption. A large portion of the country’s foreign export and GDP is also based on them. Diamond smuggling and other exploitations of resources have added to the conflict. Even now it is thought that the government still does not regulate the diamonds properly is filled with corruption. The continuance of illegal smuggling only adds to the conflict (Freeman, 2008). The violence is continued by what is referred to as “blood diamonds”; these diamonds are used to finance the rebel group’s militant activities. The Revolutionary United Front or RUF leads the violence within Sierra Leone (De Koning, 2008). The RUF was backed by the Liberian government of Charles Taylor, who had the plan that he would force the Sierra Leone government with the RUF to forfeit from ECOMOG or the Economic Community of West African States Military Observer Group. Taylor used ethnic agitation as a method for the division of people in Sierra Leone (TED, 2000). The RUF caused millions of internally displaced people, committed acts of genocide and tortured victims by cutting off their hands and other body parts and took over the capital of Sierra Leone, Freetown. Originally the RUF was able to fight ECOMOG but eventually they were able to drive the RUF out of Freetown and regaining control. Though this would not be the last of the RUF with their "Operation No Living Thing" even though they were not the force they once were the instability of it was able to inflict much damage on ECOMOG and any civilians they encountered.
In 1999 the UN Mission in Sierra Leone or UNAMSIL replaced ECOMOG and worked to enforce the Lome Accord, a peace agreement signed on July 7th by the RUF and government of Sierra Leone. However, the peace was short lived and the RUF was able to use this as a way to gain for weapons (Adebajo, 2002). The United Kingdom came in to assist and the RUF was again slightly taken out of commission but they regrouped and gained many of the mining areas where they are able to maintain some power because of the exploitation of the “blood diamonds.” While there are several other variables that go into the escalation of violence in Sierra Leone and the perpetuation of the RUF, much of this is because of exploitations of natural resources. The small country of Sierra Leone has many great natural resources but not a lot of infrastructure that is capable of containing much of the turmoil along with the lack of development of other aspects in the economy aid in the recruitment of youth into the RUF and other similar rebel groups (TED, 2000).
Chester Crocker has a little more complex way of explaining conflict other than Mamdani’s idea of political, economic, and cultural as the reasons for conflicts. Chester Crocker suggests that conflicts that cannot be solved or be solved in a reasonable manner are intractable conflicts and they can also be when the parties involved in the conflict decide it cannot be mediated and any attempt to do so will not be able to end the conflict. These conflicts are longstanding, but not all of them, and these conflicts can be initiated by many different variables such as religion, economic, cultural, and political differences to name a few. Other variables causing the escalation of conflicts have to do with leaders that result in political gains from the continuation of conflicts. It does not have to be just leadership that wants the continuation of the conflict but others that have a stake in the continued escalation of the conflict, these parties are known as spoilers. There are many cases around the world that can be labeled intractable conflicts. The basic characteristics of an intractable conflict are (1) typically long standing (2)the remain unresolved (3) continuation of violence (4) there are vested interests by parties involved in the conflict (Crocker, 2004).
Another conflict to look at would be the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh. It is not formally recognized by any government, and this long standing conflict has remained unresolved. Nagorno-Karabakh is an autonomous region created by the Soviet Union in 1924 and 94 percent of this region was Armenia. Until the fall of the former Soviet Union the region was mainly peaceful but after the fall of USSR conflicts began to erupt and escalate. Prior to the fall of the Soviet Union the region of Nagorno-Karabakh was on its way of perusing the “spirit of Perestroika” when the Armenians of that region did not want to be under control of the Azerbaijanis. This movement turned into a political organization that was known as “the Karabakh Committee” which was against communism and for democracy, and national sovereignty. The December 1988 Earthquake devastated much of the region, and at the time the Soviet Leaders decided to arrest many members of the committee and thought that by doing this it would keep the election in March of 1989 intact without problems. However, this backfired, and only worsened things within the region to the point of generating massive demonstrations, which resulted in the release of committee members after the election (Global Security, 2009).
Similarities to the conflict in Liberia and Sierra Leone have to do with economic stakes such as oil and natural gas. Azerbaijan has a blockade that does not allow Armenia proper fuel supplies and offered in exchange for the occupied land back a pipeline that would go through Armenia so it could go to Turkey. The exchange would allow Armenia to also make transit revenues from the pipeline but Armenia has decided that they would not accept (Lalazarian, 1997). The impacts of this have resulted into a bloody conflict for control of the region. The fighting has been between the ethnic Armenians and ethnic Azerbaijanis with the result of the ethnic Azerbaijanis being drove out of the region and displaced. There was finally a cease-fire in May of 1994, and it has been in place since then but there has not been a decisive negotiation to this date and the immense amount of displaced people remains over a million; while direct violence is calmed down there is was and still is a continuation of violence (Global Security, 2009). However, while the ethnicities continue to fight it seem to be other variables causing the escalation of conflicts such as leaders that would like political gains from the continuation of conflicts. There has been constant mediation from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) but this conflict has remained in dispute (CIA World Factbook, 2009).
Upon the determination that there is a conflict and the UN is planning a peace keeping operation there needs to be a way of dealing with it. Even using the basic troop leading procedures, such as, what the US Army follows the UN could be more effective: (1) receive the mission, (2) issue a warning order; (3) make a tentative plan; (4) start necessary movement; (5) conduct reconnaissance; (6) complete the plan; (7) issue a complete order; (8) supervise and refine (Army Study Guide, 1999). While those procedures may not actually be able to explain a construct they can be used in the planning phase once an operation in place. If enough information is available to make a hasty operations order it will help evaluate several factors. In looking at a construct, there must be a more effective process in the implementation of a plan such as using several variables. The situation in Liberia and Sierra Leone is both simplistic and extremely complex at the same time. Much of the violence has to do with gains and much of the violence, though some of it is not based on ethnicity but on collective group gains and political gains by officials prompting groups like this. The UN needs to have concrete standard operations procedures (SOP's) when conducting peace keeping operations. They needed to have a standard procedure to use as a framework for operations, the five basic paragraphs of the operations order the US Army uses on a day to day basis is: Situation, Mission, Execution, Service and Support, Command and Signal could be used to incorporate a way to build a construct (Army Study Guide, 1999). Proper planning in this format makes it easy to plug in information and build a model. Conflicts on the group may change, but the more prepared a peace keeping force is with internal SOP's on the group the more likely they can be effective.
The conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone have much to do with politics and economics. Ethnicity may not be perfect but it is not a major factor in most of the violence. Crocker’s idea that that intractable conflicts are: (1) typically long standing (2)they remain unresolved (3) there is a continuation of violence (4) and there are vested interests by parties involved in the conflict fits into the framework of a construct. From Mamdani there is his idea of the political and economical aspect and an emphasis from Crocker’s idea that vested interests by parties involved in the conflict continues the violence. Forming a construct into the vested interests by parties involved in the conflict aid in the political and economic exploitation of these countries. The other variables of the conflict are important to address but these are the major parts of the construct; the rest are supplementary factors. The construct implementing the five basic paragraphs of the operations order as a basic framework, the troop leading procedures during for the planning of the construct and the new construct: the vested interests by parties involved in the conflict aid in the political and economic exploitation of these countries will give a easier way to look at the conflict and the ability to deal with them quicker because much of the planning is incorporated in the building phase of the construct.
References
Adebajo, A. (2002). Building Peace in West Africa: Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea-Bissau. Lynne rienner publishers. Retrieved from http://www.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v7/v7i4a11.htm
Army Study Guide (1999). Sample 5 Paragraph Operations Order; updated November 22, 2005. Retrieved from http://www.armystudyguide.com/content/Leadersbook_information/leadersbook_items/sample-5-paragraph-operat-2.shtml
Army Study Guide (1999). Troop Leading Procedures; updated December 10, 2005. Retrieved from http://www.armystudyguide.com/content/army_board_study_guide_topics/survival/troop-leading-procedures-3.shtml
CIA World Factbook (2009) Armenia. Retrieved from https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/am.html
Crocker, C., Hampson, & Aall, P. (2004). Taming Intractable Conflicts: Mediation in the Hardest Cases. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press.
De Koning, R. (2008). Resource–conflict links in Sierr a Leone and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Sip ri insights on peace and security. Retrieved from http://books.sipri.org/files/insight/SIPRIInsight0802.pdf
Fornace, K. (2009). The Rwandan Genocide Retrieved from http://crinfo.beyondintractability.org/case_studies/rwandan_genocide.jsp?nid=6815
Freeman, C. (2008). The Failures of Post-Conflict Reconstruction in Sierra Leone and the Threat to Peace. Beyond intractability. Retrieved from http://www.beyondintractability.org/case_studies/reconstruction_sierra_leone.jsp?nid=6811
Global Security (2009) Nagorno-Karabakh. Retrieved from http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/nagorno-karabakh.htm
Lalazarian, K. (1997). Nagorno War. Ice case studies. Retrieved from http://www1.american.edu/TED/ice/NAGORNO.HTM
TED, (2000). Diamond Trade in Sierra Leone. Ice case studies. Retrieved from http://www1.american.edu/TED/ice/diamond.htm
United Nations: UNAMIR (2001). UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA (October 1993-March 1996). Retrieved from http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unamir.htm
